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RIGHTS OF NONLEASING FRACTIONAL MINERAL
INTEREST OWNERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Diversified ownership of the mineral estates under North
Dakota and other western lands is now so common as to be
considered the rule rather than the exception. For various reasons
- including problems in identifying and locating fractional
mineral interest owners, differing opinions on the best way to
manage the common property, and mistake on the part of a
mineral interest lessee - owners of fractional mineral interests may
find that a portion of the mineral interest has been leased without
their knowledge or participation.
This Note will examine the relative rights of nonleasing and
leasing mineral interest owners. It will first look at the rights of
mineral owners to lease, enter, and develop their mineral
properties. The responsibilities of mineral owners who develop the
common estate without their co-owner's participation will also be
examined. Finally, the way that oil and gas conservation statutes
alter and supplement the rights of mineral interest owners will be
discussed.
While an effort has been made to locate and use North Dakota
law when appropriate, many of the questions addressed in this
Note have not been litigated in North Dakota. As a result, North
Dakota practitioners will have to look to other jurisdictions for
guidance in answering oil and gas questions. This Note was
prepared to facilitate this effort.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
II. RIGHTS OF MINERAL INTEREST OWNERS PRIOR TO
PRODUCTION
Owners of fractional mineral interests enjoy equal rights to
commonly owned minerals, including the rights to explore and
develop the minerals, in proportion to their undivided share of the
whole.' From this it follows that a nonleasing mineral interest
owner can not force another cotenant or that cotenant's lessee to
explore or develop minerals. For example, in the Kansas case of
Krug v. Krug,2 owners of nine-elevenths of the mineral estate
attempted to compel exploration for oil by suing their lessee, the
owner of the other two-elevenths and his lessee. 3 The court ordered
defendant Ray Krug to allow plaintiffs lessee to explore, develop,
and produce oil and gas on the common property. 4 Additionally,
the court ordered that defendant Krug be carried for the expense of
a test well 5 and that he be given his proportionate share of the oil
and gas produced, less his proportionate share of the expenses. 6
The court in Krug applied the general rules of law set out in
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen. 7 In Prairie Oil & Gas development of
the mineral estate by one tenant in common was held not to
constitute waste because the extraction of oil from an oil well is the
use not the destruction of the estate. 8 As a result, a tenant in
1. 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 502 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS
& MEYERS). This statement represents the view held in most oil and gas producing states and is a
modification of the common law rule of waste established by the statute of Westminster I1, ch. 22
(1285) adopted by the several states either as a part ofthe common law or by statute. Id. § 502 n.3.
2. 5 Kan. App. 2d 426, 618 P.2d 323 (1980).
3. Krug v. Krug, 5 Kan. App. 2d 426, __ , 618 P.2d 323, 324 (1980). James H. Norris
owned a lease on defendant Ray R. Krug's two-elevenths interest. At the time of trial, Norris
released his lease, removing himself from the lawsuit and leaving Ray Krug's two-elevenths
unleased. Id.
4. Id. at__ , 618 P.2d at 324.
5. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 84 (5th ed. 1981)
1hereinafter cited as OIL & GAS TERMS]. A carried interest is defined as follows:
A fractional interest in oil and gas property, usually a lease, the holder of which has no
personal obligation for operating costs, which are to be paid by the owner or owners of
the remaining fraction, who reimburse themselves therefor out of production, if any.
The person advancing the costs is the carrying party and the other is the carried party.
Id.
6. 5 Kan. App. 2d at __ , 618 P.2d at 324. The trial court's order, quoted in the appellate
opinion, emphasized that Ray Krug would not be charged with or obligated to pay any costs of
drilling a dry hole. If production were obtained, however, Cities Service Company, the drilling
operator, would be entitled to withhold a part of Krug's share of produ-etion equal to his share of the
reasonable costs of development and production. Id.
On appeal Krug did not contest the right of plaintiffs lessee to go on the land and drill or the
order enjoining him from interfering with that right. Rather, Krug complained that the order created
a contractual relationship between him and the drilling operator without his consent. The court
expressed its opinion that the relationship was only quasi-contractual. Id. at __ , 618 P.2d at 324-
25.
7. 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924).
8. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1924). In his opinionjudge Phillips
cited cases from England, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia to
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common may develop and produce oil and gas from the common
property even without the consent of his cotenant so long as he does
not exclude that cotenant. 9 If a cotenant does not wish to develop
the property himself, he may lease only his share.' ° The lease of this
portion will be valid; therefore, no trespass will be committed
against any other tenant in common. "
The principles enumerated in Prairie Oil & Gas Co. suggest that
the remedy for a nonleasing mineral owner who thinks that a
leasing mineral owner and his lessee are not properly managing the
common interest is to find a lessee of his own. 12 Additional support
for this proposition is found in the rule that the right to develop the
common property is nonexclusive.' 3 Relying on this rule of
nonexclusion, in Garcia v. Sun Oil Co. 14 the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed the granting of a temporary injunction to protect
the interest of a petitioner who shows a probable right to recovery
and a probable recovery. 15 Sun Oil Company was allowed to enter
and drill on property involved in a title dispute because it could
show with sufficient certainty that it was the plaintiff's cotenant.'
6
Thus, the court affirmed the right of a cotenant to enter common
property even in the face of a title dispute.' 7
support the rule of nonwaste, and from Illinois, Louisiana, and West Virginia for contrary authority.
Id.
Another rule which seeks to deal with the special nature ofoil and gas is the rule of capture. The
rule of capture has been expressed as follows: "The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil
and gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil
or gas migrated from adjoining lands. " H ardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to
Oil and Gas, 13 TEXAS L. REv. 391, 393 (1935). The rule of capture has the legal effect of precluding
liability for causing oil or gas to migrate across property lines or for producing oil or gas originally in
place under the land of another, so long as the well itself does not trespass. The remedy for the
injured landowner under this rule has generally been that of self-help - "go and do likewise."
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 365, 65 A. 801, 802 (1907). See generally I F.
KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS §§ 4.1-3, 4.6 (1962); 1 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS §§ 61-63
(1954); 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, SS 204.4-,5; Shank, Present Status of the Law of Capture, 6
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 257, 268 (1955).
9. 2 F.2d at 571. See also Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), aff'd,
108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139 (1917). In Burnham the court said that due to the fugacious nature of oil
and gas, it must be promptly taken from the land. Were one cotenant allowed to block development
by withholding consent he could arbitrarily destroy the value of the lanq . 147 S.W. at 335.
10. 2 F.2d at 572.
11. Id. The Prairie Oil & Gas court in reaching this rule distinguished the case of Howard v.
Manning, 79 Okla. 165, 192 P. 358 (1920), in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court had expressed a
contrary rule. The court in Prairie Oil & Gas concluded that the earlier case referred to a lease by one
tenant in common of the entire common property, and occupancy by the lessee to the exclusion of
other cotenants. Id.
12.2 F.2d at 572.
13. See, e.g., Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, -, 27 P.2d 855, 858
(1933). This statement appears in a listing of undisputed principles of law applied to Mid-Continent
and recognized or announced in Prairie Oil &Gas Co. v. Allen.
14. 300 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
15. Garcia v. Sun Oil Co., 300 S.W.2d 724, 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
16. Id. at 736. Sun Oil Company had cross-claimed in a quiet title action, seeking the right to
enter and develop a portion of the property involved in the suit. Id. at 725. The trial court granted
the injunction allowing Sun Oil to go forward with its development. Id. at 733.
17. Id. at 736. The court's opinion quotes in great detail from the parties' pleadings. In making
its decision the court did not examine the record title introduced at trial, but did find that Sun Oil
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In addition to injunctive relief, damages have been found
appropriate where one cotenant excludes another. In Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Kishi 8 a lessee entered and drilled after his right to
do so had terminated. 19 Kishi protested the entry, but Humble Oil
claimed the exclusive right to the leasehold. 20 Oil had been found
on adjoining land prior to the entry, and as a result, the market
value of the leasehold was $1,000 an acre. 21 Humble Oil, however,
completed a dry hole causing the leasehold interest to have no
value. 22 Even though the oil company had entered the common
property in the good faith belief that its lease had not terminated,
the court held the company liable for the loss in value to the
leasehold as a consequence of its exclusion of Kishi.
2 3
As a last remedy, a tenant in common may ratify the lease and
sue as a party to the contract. 24 Such a suit could be based on the
implied covenants to explore and to develop. 25 These covenants
impose a duty on the lessee to commence drilling of an initial well
within a reasonable time2 6 and upon securing production of oil or
had established its position as a cotenant and that the relationship was secure even if appellants
Garcia won their suit in trespass to try title. Id. This case shows the willingness of the trial and
appellate courts to enforce the right of a cotenant to enter common property to develop the mineral
estate even though the exact terms of the cotenancy are in dispute. Id.
18. 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. 1925).
19. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190, 190 (Tex. 1925). Kishi and Lang,
owners of three-fourths and one-fourth undivided interests in oil and mineral rights respectively,
leased their interests to Humble Oil and Refining Company for a three year period beginning
December 23, 1919. Lang, however, did not acknowledge the lease until January 29, 1920. Humble
Oil entered and began drilling on January 23, 1923. Kishi protested this entry, but Lang consented.
Id.
20. Id. Humble Oil claimed that the lease had not expired and that under its terms it would not
expire until three years after it was signed and acknowledged by Lang. Since they began drilling
before January 29, 1923, the anniversary date of Lang's signing, Humble claimed to have extended
the lease under its own terms. Id.
21. Id. at 190-91.
22. Id. at 190. Humble Oil remained in possession under its January 23 entry until May 10,
1923, when having completed drilling a dry hole it abandoned its efforts. Id. Because of this failure to
find oil on the tract the leasehold interest was found to be of no value. Id. at 191.
23. Id. In the suit by Kishi against Humble Oil for damages, the district court awarded damages
of one dollar, holding that the amount of damages sustained was unascertainable. Id. The court of
civil appeals held that Kishi was entitled to recover the actual loss suffered as a result of the wrongful
entry and exclusion, but that proof of the market value of the leasehold interest was a legally
insufficient basis for the amount of the recovery. Kishi v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 261 S.W.
228, 232-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). The Commission of Appeals recommended that the court of
appeals be reversed and that the trial court's judgment be retained allowing Kishi three-fourths of
the market value of the leasehold interest and that the proof offered was sufficient to establish this
market price. 276 S.W. at 191. The supreme court entered its judgment in accordance with these
recommendations. Id.
24. OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 5, at 616. Ratification of a lease has been defined as an
agreement ratifying and confirming a lease executed by a concurrent owner other than the original
lessor, and an act by such person which by implication ratifies and confirms the lease. See Humble
Oil & Refining Co. v. Clark, 126 Tex. 262, 87 S.W.2d 471 (1935) (lessor's execution after an oil and
gas lease had allegedly terminated for failure to pay rentals of a mineral deed but the oil and gas lease
was treated as still subsisting constitutes ratification sufficient to revive it).
25. See Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral
Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 177 (1976) (implied covenants). See also 2 E. BROWN, THE
LAW OF OIL & GAS LEASES §§ 16.01-.05 (2d ed. rev. 1973); 5 E. KuNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS, §§ 54.1 -
62.5 (1978); 2 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS §§ 395-416 (1959); 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 1, 5§ 801-878.
26. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 811.
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gas from the leasehold, to drill such additional wells to develop the
premises as is reasonably prudent. 2" Some commentators suggest,
however, that the covenants to explore and to drill an initial well
have been replaced or rendered insignificant because an oil and gas
lease typically terminates automatically if a well is not drilled or if
delay rentals are not paid within a fixed period.2 8 Although this
suggestion may be true during the primary term of an oil and gas
lease, 29 there is strong authority refuting the argument that
exploration, accompanied or unaccompanied by production, of a
portion of a lease under all circumstances satisfies completely the
implied covenants of exploration and development.30 As a result, it
is arguable that the implied covenants to explore and to develop
may provide an additional remedy for a nonleasing cotenant.
Thus, nonleasing mineral interest cotenants have no special
status in the period prior to development and production; that is,
they have no right, privilege, or remedy greater than any other
mineral interest owner. A nonleasing cotenant can neither block
nor compel development by a leasing cotenant. 31 This results from
the rule that the right to develop is nonexclusive.3 2 A nonleasing
cotenant has no right to exclude a cotenant 33 and may enter and
develop his own interest at any time. 34 Should a cotenant exclude or
be excluded by another cotenant, injunctive relief ensuring entry
35
and damages3 6 are available as remedies. If he so chooses he may
27.5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1. S 832.
28. Martin, supra note 25, at 179; see also Moses, The Evolution and Development of the Oil and Gas
Lease, 2 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 1 (1951). Moses traces the history of oil and gas leases to the
present point where the drilling clause used in most oil and gas leases is the "unless" clause,
generally construed as a conveyance on common law limitation. Such a conveyance provides for the
automatic termination upon the happening of the limitation, nondrilling or nonpayment of proper
delay rentals. Id. at 23.
29. OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 5, at 570-71. The primary term of an oil and gas lease has been
defined as follows:
The period of time, typically five or ten years, during which a lease may be kept alive
by a lessee even though there is no production in paying quantities by virtue of drilling
operations on the leased land or the payment of rentals. After the expiration of the
primary term, the lease usually can be kept alive only by [production in paying
quantities], absent some savings clause in the lease. ...
Id.
30. See Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934) (lessee could not hold
entire 360 acre leasehold indefinitely by production from 40 acre spacing unit). See also Sinclair Oil &
Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959) (trial court's order requiring Sinclair to drill 30
exploratory wells within five years, to surrender the lease acreage, or to pay money penalties
upheld).
31. Krug v. Krug, 5 Kan. App. 2d at __ , 618 P.2d at 325.
32. Earp v, Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. at __, 27 P.2d at 858; Burnham v.
Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. at 335.
33. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d at 573.
34. Id.
35. Garcia v. Sun Oil Co., 300 S.W.2d at 734.
36. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. at IQ I
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ratify the lease made by his cotenant 37 and he will then have the
rights of one privy to the contract.
3
1
III. RIGHTS OF NONLEASING MINERAL OWNERS IN
THE EVENT OF DEVELOPMENT
A. THE RIGHT OF MINERAL OWNERS TO INITIATE DEVELOPMENT
1. Concurrent Interest Owners
The law concerning cotenants begins with the propositionthat
each concurrent interest owner has the right to lease his interest and
to explore for and develop the common mineral interest without
liability for waste. 39 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen40 and its progeny
4
have established this principle. The rationale for this position is
that oil and gas are a part of an estate that can be enjoyed only by
removal. The taking of oil from an oil well is the use and not the
destruction of the estate. 42 Additionally, the fugacious nature of oil
and gas requires special treatment. 43  These rules represent the
majority view. 44 Courts following the majority view have adjusted
37. OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 5, at 482.
38. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 505.2.
39. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 573 (8th Cir. 1924).
40. 2 F.2d 566.
41. See Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 855 (1933) (citing
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 573 (8th Cir. 1924), as recognizing or announcing
undisputed principles of law). See also P & N Investment Corp. v. Florida Ranchettes, Inc., 220 So.
2d 451 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (more recent case citing Prairie Oil & Gas on this point).
42.2 F. 2d at 571.
43. Id.
44. The three jurisdictions noted as adopting a rule of waste in Prairie Oil & Gas were Illinois,
Louisiana and West Virginia. Id. Louisiana codified this position in S 31.175 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes Annotated. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.175 (West 1975). This section provides that
"[al co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct operations on the property subject to the
servitude without the consent of the other co-owner." Id. The official comments to this statute
suggest that the nonoperator claims his share of production subject to the obligation to account for
his share of investment and operating cost. Id. (Official Comments) (citing Huckabay v. Texas Co.,
277 La. 191, 78 So. 2d829 (1955)).
The situation in the other two states seems to be best reflected by an observation from 2
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 502 n.3. It is stated as follows:
The states which view production by a concurrent owner as waste have been
quick to find that a non-joining concurrent owner has ratified a lease executed by
another concurrent owner, thereby authorizing the extraction of minerals, Thus in
Sommers v. Bennett, 68 W. Va. 157, 69 S.E. 690 (1910), it was held that ratification
of a lease was accomplished by the filing of a suit by a non-joining cotenant for an
accounting. Statutes in such states have also authorized the leasing of land under
certain circumstances when concurrent owners cannot reach an agreement.
Id.
North Dakota appears to adhere to the majority position. In Schank v. North Am. Royalties,
Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972), the North Dakota Supreme Court's syllabus states the following:
Owners of undivided fractional interests in oil and gas in and under the same land
are tenants in common and each has a right to enter upon the land for the purpose of
exploring for oil and gas and may drill and develop the same without the consent of the
NOTE
common law rules, such as waste, to accommodate interests in
minerals that may migrate to a well on neighboring land. One
illustration of this effort is the following observation by the Illinois
Supreme Court:
The stern rule of liability of a cotenant, who commits
waste or damage to the common property, has been
relaxed where the profit taken from the land is of a
fugacious nature and liable to be exhausted by adjacent
operators. In such cases the rule allowing deductions for
money spent in protecting, preserving and marketing
applies, and where the subject matter is oil, the cotenant
who takes it from the land must account to his cotenants
for their respective proportions of the net value of the oil
produced, which is its market value, less the cost of
extracting and marketing it.
4 5
In short, any concurrent interest owner may enter and develop the
common mineral interest; however, the cotenant must account to
his cotenants for the market value of the latter's share less
reasonable and necessary expenses.
4 6
Should one cotenant unsuccessfully explore the mineral estate
without the consent of his cotenant, the developing cotenant bears
the risk and the expense of his action.4 7 Even if an agreement does
exist between parties, any expenditure beyond that consented to is
chargeable only against the share of production from the well for
other. Each cotenant acts for himself, and one is not the agent of the other nor has he
the authority to bind the other merely because he is a cotenant, unless he is authorized
to do so.
Id. at 422. In the body of the Schank opinion the court listed the principles set out above as general
rules established in other jurisdictions and noted that they were in harmony with the laws of North
Dakota. Id. at 429.
45. Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 388 Il1. 26, , 27 N.E.2d 356, 362 (1944).
46. Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419, 429 (N.D. 1972). See, eg.,
Robinson v. Southwestern Dev. Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 1, -, 277 P.2d 825, 827 (1954)
(applying general rule in approving charges against nondeveloping cotenants for proportionate
share); Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky. 1955) (finding that
plaintiff was not trespasser against other cotenants); Mershon v. Essley, 204 Okla. 660, -, 233
P.2d 293, 297 (1951) (quoting from Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, -,
27 P.2d 855, 858 (1933)); Smith v. Sabine Royalty Corp., 556 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (cotenant plaintiff had right to drill and produce oil and gas without defendant's consent, but
must account for expenses and profits).
47. Davis v. Sherman, 149 Kan. 104, __ , 86 P.2d 490 (1939). The parties in the Davis case
were cotenants in an oil and gas lease. Production had been obtained from a well on the property and
a division order executed. Davis drilled a second well which was completed as a dry hole. The
Kansas Supreme Court held that where the defendants had neither agreed to nor ratified Davis'
operations they had no personal liability for the drilling expenses. Id. at __ , 86 P.2d at 490. See
also Willson v. Superior Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (in the absence of an
agreement, a cotenant who drills a dry hole does so at his own risk and without right to
reimbursement).
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which the expenditure was made. 48 For example, one court denied
an operating cotenant a lien against production from other wells for
the expense of unsuccessfully "fracking' ,49 one well. 50
From this discussion it can be seen that any cotenant can
execute a valid lease covering his interest in a mineral estate
without the consent of other cotenants.5 t He may also develop the
common estate without the consent of other cotenants. 52 If he does,
however, he alone bears the risk of loss from unsuccessful
operations. 
5 3
2. Successive Interest Owners
In the case of successive interests in the mineral estate,
development by the life tenant alone is waste, and by the
remainderman alone, trespass. 54  The rules and authority
applicable to successive interests are stated in Welborn v. Tidewater
Associated Oil Co. 5 5 First, a remainderman may not execute an oil
and gas lease permitting immediate exploration and production
without the consent of the life tenant.5 6 Second, a life tenant may
not drill new oil and gas wells or lease the land to others for that
purpose.57 The life tenant and remainderman together, however,
may lease the land by a joint lease. 58 They may agree as to the
48. Ashland Oil & Refining Co, v. Bond, __ Ark. ., -, 263 S.W.2d 74, 76
(1953) (withholding return from two different wells was wrong as colessee's pro rata responsibility for
expenses was not a personal liability, but an offset against his claim to proceeds from the well for
which expenditures were made).
49. OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 5, at 675. Sand-fracking is an operation designed to loosen or
break up tight formations which contain oil or gas by injecting a mixture or blend of crude oil and
sand into the producing formation under high pressure by means of pressure pumps, followed by
injections of rubberized nylon balls to seal off the fractured formation. Id. The purpose of the
operation is to increase the permeability (or ability of fluids to flow through the rock) and production.
Id.
50. Knight v. Mitchell, 97 I1. App. 2d 178, -, 240 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1968) (reversing lower
court judgment awarding costs for fracking to operating cotenant because defendant had not
consented to operation).
51. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F 2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1924).
52. Id. at 571.
53. Willson v. Superior Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (finding that
document at issue was not a mere restatement of dates under law of cotenancy because its terms
obligated Superior Oil Company to pay share of expenses even in event ofdry hole).
54. Welborn v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 217 F.2d 509, 510 (10th Cir. 1954) (lease from
remainderman alone grants only contingent right to go upon the land and develop it for oil and gas
and produce oil therefrom after death of the life tenant, in the event that death occurs prior to the
expiration of the primary term of the lease).
55. 217 F.2d 509.
56. Id. at 510. Accord Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg, 112 F.2d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 1940) (deciding
the validity of leases executed by the life tenants and two of five remainder interests); Bordon v.
Gypsy Oil Co., 141 Kan. 147, -, 40 P.2d 463, 468 (1935) (stating rights of life tenant and
remainderman in deciding what rights survive death of life tenant).
57. 217 F.2d at 510. AccordShultis v. MacDougal, 162 F. 331 (8th Cir. 1907) (stating general
discussion finding lease from life tenant invalid); Barnes v. Keys, 36 Okla. 6, -, 127 P. 261,
262 (1912) (stating general rule).
58. 217 F.2d at 510. Accord Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedemann Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361,
277 S.W. 323, 324 (1924) (finding lease, otherwise valid, conveys interest when jointly executed by
life tenant and remainder interest).
division of rents and royalties, 59 but in the absence of such an
agreement, the life tenant is entitled to only the income from such
royalties. 60
Rents and royalties collected without the approval of other
successive interest holders are distributed according to the laws of
property in the jurisdiction involved. Thirty-six jurisdictions have
adopted either the 1931 or 1962 version of the Uniform Principle
and Income Act, which would apply to such a situation.
6 1
The law of successive interests requires that any lease must be
executed jointly by the owners to be valid, so practically, there is no
possibility of development without the involvement of all owners.
62
Because individual holders of successive. interests possess limited
authority to lease oil and gas interests and to otherwise participate
in development of the mineral estate, this Note will not deal with
those interests in greater detail.
B. BAsIs FOR ACCOUNTING FOR MINERALS REMOVED FROM
PROPERTY
Once production is obtained from a commonly owned
leasehold, the concern of a nonleasing cotenant can easily shift from
the propriety of the developer's entry and the terms governing the
exploration of the mineral estate to the identification of the share
that the nonleasing cotenant is entitled to as part owner of the
minerals being produced. If a tenant in common produces and
markets oil or gas from common land with the knowledge and
consent of his cotenant, he is accountable for the amount of the
royalty customarily paid in the locality where the wells are
located. 63 But when one cotenant develops and sells oil or gas from
59. 217 F.2d at 510.
60. Id. at 511. Accord Borden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 141 Kan. 147, -, 40 P.2d 463, 468 (1935):
Barnesv. Keys, 36Okla. 6, __ , 127 P. 261, 263 (1912).
61. For the text of the uniform acts and variation notes and annotation materials for adopting
jurisdictions, see 7A U.L.A. 429 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
62. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, S 513, at 646.1. The law of mines and minerals
provides one narrow possibility for development which is described in the following passage:
The most important exception to the general rules limiting the power of a life
tenant to sever and remove minerals without the concurrence of the owner of a future
interest in the land arises from the operation of the "open mine" doctrine. If a mine
has been opened before the creation of a life estate and a future interest in land, the life
tenant may be entitled to continue to operate the opened mine and retain the proceeds
of such operation, the owner of the future interest not being entitled to have such
proceeds impounded or to receive an apportioned share thereof. The basis of the open
mine doctrine appears to be that a life tenant given the beneficial enjoyment of land is
entitled to enjoy the land in the same manner as it was enjoyed before the creation of
the life estate.
Id. (footnote omitted).
63. Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill. 15, -, 86 N.E. 567, 601 (1908).
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the common estate without the consent of his cotenant, one of
several rules will apply. To determine which rule will apply one
must consider the jurisdiction and the factual setting, with the
central inquiry being the issue of good faith. 64 Some courts have
granted nonconsenting mineral owners their proportionate share
of royalties, 6 while other courts have awarded nonconsenting
mineral owners the value of the oil produced, less the reasonable
costs of development and production. 
66
In McIntosh v. Ropp 67 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania up-
held the lower court's findings that a lease granted by a life tenant
and ratified by one remainderman was valid and that the lessee had
acted in good faith. 68 The court first cited the general rule that
compensation is the measure of damages when no facts show
intentional wrong. 69 It then stated that between tenants in
common, compensation may be measured by the fair market value
of the minerals in place figured on the basis of the royalty to be
obtained for the privilege of removing the minerals.70 The court
also discussed, but did not apply, the harsher rule that
compensation is the market value of the oil minus the reasonable
costs of producing and marketing the minerals. 7
The good faith royalty rule has also been applied in Texas and
Illinois. Fyffe v. Fyffe, 72 an Illinois case, involved a lease executed by
the father, step-brother, and step-sister of three unsigned fractional
interest owners. In an earlier decision the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that the lease was presumed to be made for the benefit of all
cotenants.7 3 This presumption and the fact that the unsigned owner
64. For general discussions of the rules applied to accounting between cotenants and cases
relative to the various rules see 2 E. KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS 5§ 5.2-5.6, 8.1, 8.3, 8.4 (1962); 1
W. SUMMERS, THE LAw OF Ot AND GAS §§ 37-38 (1954); 2 WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, supra note 1,
504-504.3.
65. Fyffe v. Fyffe, 292 Il. App. 539, -, 11 N.E.2d 857, 864 (1937) (applying royalty
measure when lease granted by life tenant and two of five remainder interests).
66. Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, 259 (W.D. Okla. 1957) (cotenant had duty to
account to his cotenant for its proportion of share of market value of oil and gas produced, less
reasonable costs of development, production, and marketing).
67. 233 Pa. 497, 82 A. 949 (1912).




72. 292 Il. App. 539, 11 N.E.2d 857 (1937) (Fyffe II). Fyffe II was a suit for an accounting by
Lee, Cynthia (Holsen), and Fred Fyffe. The property involved passed by the laws of intestate
succession to Charles Fyffe and his four children, Grace, Roy, Pearl, andJulia. Id. at 542, 11 N.E.2d
at 859. When Pearl and Julia died intestate they were survived by their father, brother, sister, and
the three plaintiffs, children of Charles' second marriage. Id.
73. Fyffe v. Fyffe, 350 Ill. 620, 626-27, 183 N.E. 641, 643 (1932) (Fyffe I). Charles executed an
oil and gas lease on the property in 1906, acting individually and as guardian for his minor children.
The interests of the three children by the second marriage, however, were not accounted for. They
brought suit to partition the property and for an accounting when in 1931 they discovered their
interest in the estate. Id. at 642. The appeal in Fyffe I was by the defendants protesting the decree of
partition, which was affirmed by the supreme court. Id. at 644. Fyffe II involved in part the issue of
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had not protested until after twenty years of production caused the
trial and appellate courts to hold that the proper basis for
accounting was the one-eighth royalty provided for in the lease. 74
Similarly, the Texas case of Powell v. Johnson75 involved an
heir's interest in his father's land after Powell's mother leased the
entire interest. 76 The court of appeals invoked the royalty rule in its
adjustment of the relative rights of the cotenants when one tenant,
having the right to produce subject to the other's right to be
protected to the extent and value of his interest, conveyed an
undivided interest over and above her share.
77
Under the royalty rule, however, some courts will apply a
higher standard and hold a developing cotenant accountable to a
nonconsenting cotenant from the time he discovers his cotenant's
interest. 78 In this situation the measure of compensation is the
market value of the oil minus the cost of producing and marketing
the oil. 79 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, after first surveying the
case law and concluding that the royalty rule was the proper one to
apply to an innocent trespasser, noted the following:
But no court . . . has gone to the extent of applying the
royalty basis of accounting, either to a willful or malicious
trespasser, or to a cotenant who operated the jointly
owned mine with the knowledge of his cotenants' interest.
From the time of acquiring such knowledge he ceases to
be an innocent bona fide operator, and he must account
to his joint owners upon a different basis.80
It thus appears that when a cotenant continues to operate the mine
after learning of another cotenant's interest and the mineral
involved is of a fugacious nature and liable to be exhausted by
adjacent operators, the developing cotenant must account for his
cotenant's share of the net value of the oil produced (market value
minus the costs of extracting and marketing).
Even when an operating cotenant is found to have acted in
the proper measure of damages to be applied in the accounting ordered in Fyffe L 292 Il!. App. at
544, 11 N.E.2d at 860.
74. 292 Ill. App. at 554-55, 11 N.E.2d at 864-65.
75. 170 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'dsub nom. Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell, 142 Tex. 63, 175
S.W.2d 960 (1943).
76. Powell v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'dsub nom. Rancho Oil Co. v.
Powell, 142 Tex. 63, 175 S.W.2d 960 (1943).
77. 170 S.W.2d at 276.
78. New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, -, 221 S.W. 245, 251 (1920)
(girl of eighteen who conveyed her land to her brother by deed voidable on account of her infancy
cancelled her deed to him and asked for an accounting by the lessee).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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good faith, some courts will use the value of the oil minus
reasonable costs as the basis of accounting. In Moore Oil v. Snakard8 '
the defendant attempted to hold his leases by continuous
operations, something the court concluded he had failed to do.
8 2
Although drilling operations were being conducted without the
benefit of a lease at the time production was reached,8 3 the court
concluded that the operations had been undertaken in good faith;
however, the court found that the defendant had a duty to account
to his cotenant for a proportionate share of the market value of the
production less the reasonable costs of development, production,
and marketing. 84 Likewise, the Kentucky Court of Appeals applied
this rule when the plaintiff's mineral interest was asserted for the
first time ten years after the mineral deed had been executed and a
producing well had been drilled. 
8 5
Under several of the accounting formulas discussed thus far,
courts allow the deduction of reasonable and necessary costs of
development and production in calculating a nonleasing cotenant's
share from a producing well. Use of the word reasonable, however,
leaves room for advocates and courts to determine what deductions
will be allowed on a case by case basis. A survey of cases
interpreting this test suggests a generous standard. Courts have
permitted deductions for machines, 86 appliances, 87  and other
means proper for producing and marketing oil, including pumping
plants and pipelines. 88 Deductions for overhead expenses, 9 or fixed
charges, such as salaries9" and other items necessary for the
equipping of a company for mining purposes have also been
permitted. 9' Some courts have even allowed deductions for
unprofitable wells drilled as part of the development of an entire
mineral estate92 and a ten percent warehouse or handling charge for
81. 150 F. Supp. 250 (W.D. Okla. 1957).
82. Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, 258 (W.D. Okla. 1957).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 259.
85. Stephens v. Click, 287 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1955) (applying rule and quoting the language
of New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. at __ , 221 S.W. at 251).
86. Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co, 147 S.W. 330, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), aff'd, 108 Tex. 555,
195 S.W. 1139(1917),
87. 147 S.W. at 334.
88. Id.
89. New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, _, 221 S.W. 245,251 (1920).
90. Id. at _ , 221 S.W. at 251.
91. Id. However, the District Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of California took a contrary
view, noting (in the context of solid minerals) that the costs of mining and milling should be
restricted to the direct costs of the process. See Daly v. Smith, 220 Cal. App. 2d 592, -, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 920, 926 (1963). Overhead costs of the partnership, executive salaries, advertising, lawyer's
fees, and other costs not falling directly under activities classified as "mining and milling" should
not be deducted. Id. at__ , 33 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
92. Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99, _, 23 P.2d 633, 636 (1933).
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stockpiles gathered to guard against shortages of supplies.9 3
However, some limits have been placed on allowable deductions.
For example, the Supreme Court of Texas denied a developing
cotenants' credit claim of six percent interest on the nonleasing
mineral owners' proportionate share of the money advanced by the
developing cotenants to pay for producing and selling the
minerals .
9 4
The usual consequence of production from a commonly owned
mineral estate, then, is an accounting by the developing cotenant to
the nonconsenting cotenant for his pro rata share of production
computed on the basis of the market price of oil or gas produced
minus the reasonable and necessary costs of production, which are
separately assessed for each factual circumstance. 95 Some courts
use the more generous royalty basis when the entry was in good
faith. 96 But even these courts will apply the above mentioned
general rule from the point that the developing cotenant becomes
aware of the nonleasing cotenant's interests. 97
C. THE RIGHT OF MINERAL OWNERS TO PARTITION
While any cotenant may enter and develop the commonly held
mineral estate98 and account to his cotenants for.their pro rata share
in the event of production,99 an additional remedy is available to a
cotenant who does not agree with this development. Case law and
commentators strongly support the proposition that all real
property is partitionable in kind or by sale as an absolute and
unconditional right.100 A clear example of this proposition can be
seen in Schnitt v. McKeller. 101 In Schnitt the Supreme Court of
Arkansas examined the case law of several jurisdictions and the
commentary on cotenancy, partition, and oil and gas law. 10 2 The
93. Id. at __, 23 P.2d at 636.
94. Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. 1965).
95. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §§ 504-504.3.
96. McIntosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa. 497, -, 82 A. 949, 954 (1912) (damages in action by
remainderman for a share of the profits under lease executed by the life tenant and ratified by one of
the remaindermen determined on basis of royalty to be obtained for privilege of removing minerals).
97. Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, 259 (W.D. Okla. 1957) (cotenant had duty to
account to his cotenant for its proportionate share of market value of oil and gas produced less
reasonable costs of development, production, and marketing as operations made beyond primary
term in good faith with due diligence).
98. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1924).
99. Id. at 572.
100. See2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, S 506.2.
101. 244 Ark. 377, 427 S.W.2d202 (1968).
102. Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, -. , 427 S.W.2d 202, 208 (1968). The com-
mentators cited and relied on in the Schnitt opinion were A. FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION
(1874); C. KNAPP, KNAPP ON PARTITION (1887); E. KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1964); H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW (1981). In its discussion of the law related to partition,
the court in Schnitt cited cases from California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky,
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result was a series of definitive statements on the subject of
partition. Cotenants have an absolute and unconditional right to
partition under both common law and statute. 103 Even when the
property involved is an estate in minerals, the right cannot be
defeated by a showing that a partition would be inconvenient,
injurious, or even ruinous to a party. 10 4 The purpose of partition
statutes that authorize the sale of the property is to avoid any
hardship caused by dividing a thing of impartible nature.105
Additionally, while a doctrine exists that vests sufficient discretion
in the courts so that they may prevent the use of a partition action
as a weapon of oppression, this matter is one to be pleaded and
proved by the defendant. 1
0 6
The Schnitt court recognized the possibility of using partition as
a weapon. The 1937 Oklahoma case of Wolfe v. Stanford, 107
however, contains the classic statement of this concern. 10 8 The
Wolfe court recognized that much of the mineral interests within the
Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas as support. 244 Ark. at _ , 427
S.W.2d at 208- 10.
103. 244 Ark. 377, , 427 S.W.2d 202, 208-09 (1968). The court quoted from Dali v.
Confidence Silver Mining Co., 3 Nev. 531, 93Am. Dec. 419(1867), toexpress thebasis ofthis right:
As the law deems it against good morals to compel joint owners to hold a thing in
common, a decree of partition . . . is not necessarily founded upon any misconduct of
the cotenants or part owners. Hence, in decreeing a partition, the rights and equities
of all the parties are respected, and the partition decreed so as to do the least possible
injury to the several owners; and "courts of equity," says Mr. Story, "may, with a
view to the more convenient and perfect partition or allotment of the premises, decree
a pecuniary compensation to one of the parties for owelty or equality of partition, so as
to prevent any injustice or unavoidable inequality."
244 Ark. at __ , 427 S.W.2d at 208-09 (citation omitted). See also Holland v. Shaffer, 162 Kan.
474, 178 P.2d 235 (1947) (discussing and applying general rules of partition in context of oil and gas
interests).
104. 244 Ark. at ___, 427 S.W.2d at 209.
105. Id. at__ , 427 S.W.2d at 209-10.
106. Id. at __ 427 S.W.2d at 210.
107. 179 Okla. 27, 64 P.2d 335 (1937).
108. Wolfe v. Stanford, 179 Okla. 27, -, 64 P.2d 335, 338 (1937). The court stated as
follows:
At this point, it is well to recognize that much of the royalty in this state has been
divided into small fractional interests and that many of those interests are now owned
by persons of limited financial means. It is at once apparent that the right to coercive
judicial partition through sale and division of the proceeds may, if wholly unqualified,
become a weapon of oppression and fraud in the hands of the financially fortunate.
Thus upon the approach of development, the right to partition might be used as a
means of foreclosing through sale the interest of the royalty owner of limited means.
Greatly enhanced value might place the property beyond his ability to elect to
purchase or bid. In the absence of disagreement between the parties rendering the co-
ownership of the property impracticable, the courts should not be impotent to prevent
themselves from becoming an instrument of fraud and oppression under the
circumstances suggested. They must, therefore, be recognized to be vested with
sufficient discretion in awarding or denying relief to avoid the evil herein anticipated.
Of course, inability of a cotenant to purchase should not constitute a defense under
brdinary circumstances, that is, in the absence of approaching development or rapidly
increasing values.
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state had been divided into small fractional interests, often held by
people of limited means. If the right to compel partition were
wholly unqualified, partition could be used as a weapon; this would
be true, for example, when upon the approach of development the
value of property became greatly enhanced, thus placing
repurchase beyond the means of a poorer owner. 109 The Wolfe court
stated that in the absence of a disagreement between the parties
rendering the co-ownership of the property impracticable, courts
should not be powerless to prevent themselves from becoming an
instrument of fraud and oppression under the circumstances
suggested. 110 The inability of a cotenant to repurchase his interest
should not constitute a defense in the absence of approaching
development or rapidly increasing values. I"'
The Wolfe court went on to say that fraud or oppression is not
to be presumed and that if these grounds are asserted as a defense
they must be pleaded and proved."' In addition, Wolfe overruled
the rule of pleading announced in Clark v. Mercer Oil Co. 113 and held
that the plaintiff need not plead facts showing circumstances other
than cotenancy, including loss of value in the property,
mismanagement, or irreconcilable differences, before partition of
oil and gas properties is warranted." t4 While this suggests an
exception to the absolute rule expressed in Schnitt, it is an exception
so limited by special facts as to be rarely invoked with success. 11
5
Moseley v. Hearrell 16 is a case in which the defendant attempted
to raise oppression as a defense. Mrs. Hearrell claimed that her
cotenant sought partition in order to acquire her interest and that




112. ld. at ___,64 P.2d at 339.
113. 139 Okla. 48, 281 P. 283 (1929) (involving partition of producing oil and gas lease, stated
as a rule of pleading that defendant in partition must plead facts showing peculiar circumstances such
as loss of value of the property, mismanagement, or irreconcilable differences as to disposition or
control of the property, in addition to diversity of ownership).
114. 179 Okla. at __, 64 P.2d at 337. In its syllabus the Clark court announced a rule of
pleading based on the Kansas case of Beardsley v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 96 P. 859
(1908). Clark v. Mercer Oil Co., 139 Okla. 48, -, 281 P.283, 284 (1929). In Beardsley the court
found that a petition that did not state facts indicating loss in the value of the property,
mismanagement, irreconcilable differences as to the management of the property, or other peculiar
circumstances justifying equitable relief could survive a demurrer. 78 Kan. at __ , 96 P. at 860.
In Clark the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that an amended petition which contained the
allegations absent in Beardsley stated a proper cause of action. 139 Okla. at __ , 281 P. at 285.
Finally, the Wolfe court overruled the Clark rule of pleading, and found that a petition seeking
partition is sufficient if the trial court can see that the parties are cotenants. 179 Okla. at __, 64
P.2d at 339.
115. A survey made for this Note of cases citing Wolfe showed none successfully blocking
partition of oil and gas interests on equitable grounds. See, e.g., Sadler v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 172 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1949); Erwin v. Hines, 190 Okla. 99, 121 P.2d 612 (1942); Collier v.
Collier, 184 Okla. 38, 84 P.2d 603 (1938).
116. 141 Tex. 280, 171 S.W.2d 337 (1943).
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able to buy the property at a receiver's sale nor realize the full value
of the property if it were sold by that method." 7 Additionally, she
alleged that she would have to pay a large federal income tax on the
money she received from the sale. 8 The Supreme Court of Texas
held that once partition is granted, equitable rules apply in
determining how the property is to be partitioned; however,
equitable principles are not material in determining whether the
right to partition may be exercised." 9 It should be noted that
although Mrs. Hearrell alleged many inequities, she did not allege
the facts that the Wolfe court said would evidence oppression - the
approach of development or rapidly increasing property values. 1
20
Therefore, because partition is expressed as an absolute right,
the issue in partition cases is not whether partition will occur, but
whether it will be made in kind or by sale.' 2' Commentators report
that a number of considerations have been urged upon those courts
asked to choose the method of partition, with each case providing
its own criteria. Among the "rules of thumb" suggested by these
commentators are the common law preference for partition in
kind 122 and the rule that producing or potentially producing lands
should be partitioned by sale. 123 Analysis of the cases dealing with
the question also suggests that when the estate to be partitioned is
the mineral fee estate the court will partition in kind, 24 and when it
is the leasehold estate it will partition by sale. 125
While an action in partition remains one that a nonleasing
mineral interest owner may use to resolve disputes between himself
and his cotenants, it is not likely to be a satisfactory method. A
117. Moseley v. Hearrell, 141 Tex. 280, 281, 171 S.W.2d 337, 337-38 (1943). Mrs. Hearrell
alleged the following:
Moseley, in seeking the partition of the property, was endeavoring to acquire her
interest therein; that she would be financially unable to buy in the property at a
receiver's sale; and that if her interest should be sold by the receiver it would not bring
its full value, and in addition she would be compelled to pay a large Federal income
tax out of her receipts from the sale.
Id. at 281, 171 S.W.2d at 337-38.
118. Id. at 281, 171 S.W.2d at 338.
119. Id. at 283, 171 S.W.2d at 338-39.
120. Id.; 179 Okla. at __, 64 P.2d at 338.
121. For discussions on partition see 1 E. KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS ch. 6 (1962); 3 OIL &
GAS REP. 21 (1954) (discussion notes); 3 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 535-538 (1958);
2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §5 506-507.
122. 3 OIL & GAS REP. 22 (1954).
123. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, S 506.3.
124. See, e.g., Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedemann Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S.W. 323 (1924)
(leasehold interest partitioned by sale); Sweeney v. Bay State Oil & Gas Co., 192 Okla. 28, 133 P.2d
538 (1943) (producing oil and gas leasehold interest partitioned by sale).
125. See Blake v. St. Catherine Gravel Co., 218 Miss. 713, 67 So. 2d 712 (1953) (order for sale of
mineral fee reversed; partition in kind proper); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Massad, 239 S.W.2d
730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (town lot in proven oil field partitioned in kind); Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Lasseter, 95 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (land in east Texas oil field, subject to
existing leases, partitioned in kind).
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cotenant may partition the property as a matter of right, 12 6 but in
most jurisdictions the appropriateness of partition in kind is a
question of fact to be decided with reference to the circumstances of
each case. 127 While the common law and American cases seem to
prefer partition in kind,1 28 partition by sale may be held the
appropriate method. If partition by sale is held appropriate, a
cotenant of limited means may be unable to buy his share of the
common estate. 12 9 Absent a showing of oppression evidenced by
approaching development or rapidly rising values, a cotenant
cannot block a partition action. 1
30
The utility of partition is further minimized by the existence of
minimum acreage requirements for drilling units under state
regulatory schemes. 131 A mineral owner might successfully separate
his interest in a partition action only to have it combined with the
same or other interests under a compulsory pooling order. 132
IV. RIGHTS AND STATUS OF MINERAL INTEREST
OWNERS AS ESTABLISHED BY OIL AND GAS
CONSERVATION STATUTES
A wealth of cases has defined the rights of mineral interest
owners and has provided the common law remedies discussed in
the first part of this Note to protect those rights. Because of the
breadth of the statutory schemes usually referred to as oil and gas
conservation statutes, mineral interest owners will probably find
little cause to resort to the common law remedies. By first setting
out the law effectively replaced but not repealed by the
conservation statutes of the several states, it is hoped that an
appreciation of the importance of these statutes to oil and gas law
will be realized.
A. THE PURPOSE AND VALIDITY OF CONSERVATION STATUTES
The stated objective of conservation statutes are to encourage
126. Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, -, 427 S.W.2d 202, 208 (1968).
127. Moseley v. Hearrell, 141 Tex. 280, 283, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338 (1943).
128. Blake v. St. Catherine Gravel Co., 218 Miss. at ____ 67 So. 2d at 714.
129. 141 Tex. at__ , 171 S.W.2d at 338.
130. Wolfe v. Stanford, 179 Okla. 27, -, 64 P.2d 335, 338 (1937).
131. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-04 (Supp. 1981) (North Dakota Industrial Commission to set
spacing unit size and shape such as will result in the efficient and economical development of the oil
and gas pool); N.D. ADMIN. CODE S 43-02-03-18 (1981) (setting governmental quarter-quarter
section as basic spacing unit for oil and 160 acres for gas).
132. See N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 38-08-08 (1980). Section 38-08-08 provides that in the absence of
voluntary pooling and upon application of an interested person, the Commission shall order
"pooling of all interests in the spacing unit for the development and operations thereof." Id.
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the efficient development of oil and gas within a pool 133 or field, 1 34
to protect the correlative rights 1 35 of the owners 136 of the interests
thus joined, and to assure the greatest possible use of vital natural
resources. 37 One way to accomplish these objectives is through the
use of compulsory pooling statutes. Compulsory pooling statutes
bring "together, as required by law or a valid order or regulation,
. ..separately owned small tracts sufficient for the granting of a
well permit under applicable spacing rules, in order to prevent the
drilling of unnecessary and uneconomical wells, which will result in
physical and economic waste.' 1 38 Pooling seeks to provide the
greatest ultimate recovery of the reservoir energy within the spaced
tract while balancing the rights and interests of those in the pooled
area. 139 The objective is to establish an area which may effectively
be drained by one well.
Compulsory pooling statutes typically require the appropriate
authority to issue an order upon just and reasonable terms and
conditions. 40 The order must allow the owner of a tract or an
interest in the spacing unit the opportunity to recover or receive his
just and equitable share of production without unnecessary
expense. 141
133. Id. 5 38-08-02(11). Section 38-08-02(11) of the North Dakota Century Code defines pool as
"an underground reservoir containing a common accumulation of oil or gas or both; each zone of a
structure which is completely separated from any other zone in the same structure is a pool...." Id.
134. Id. § 38-08-02(3). North Dakota Century Code § 38-08-02(3) defines field as "the general
area underlaid by one or more pools." Id.
135. OtI & GAs TERMS, supra note 5, at 150. Correlative rights is defined as follows:
"ITihe opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the owner of
each property in a pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil
or gas, or both, in the pool; being an amount, so far as can be practically determined,
and so far as can practicably be obtained without waste, substantially in the
proportion that the quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property
bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for such purposes to
use hisjust and equitable share of the reservoir energy." ...
There appear to be two aspects of the doctrine of correlative rights: (1) as a
corollary of the rule of capture, each person has a right to produce oil from his land
and capture such oil or gas as may be produced from his well, and (2) a right of the
land owner to be protected against damage to a common source of supply and a right
to a fair and equitable share of the source of supply.
When a legislature or administrative body regulates production practices to
protect against waste, it may also regulate to insure an equitable distribution of the
source ofsupply.
Id. (citing NEv. REV. STAT. § 522.020(l) (1981)).
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-02(9) (1980). Section 38-08-02(9) of the North Dakota Century
Code defines owner as "the person who has the right to drill into and produce from a pool and to
appropriate the oil or gas he produces therefrom either for himself or others or for himself and
others." Id.
137. Id. § 38-08-01 (declaration of policy). For similar statements of policy in the context of
unitization statutes see N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-09.1 (1980) and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.1
(West 1969).
138. Gee, Comparative Study of Compulsory Pooling-Enforcement Against Owners of Divided Interests in
the Spaced Tract, 3 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 241 (1957).
139. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 901.
140. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (1980).
141. Professors Williams, Maxwell, and Meyers provided the following introduction to
compulsory pooling and unitization in their casebook on oil and gas law:
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In some states a nonoperating owner may be able to compel
pooling. 142 One commentary, however, states that this power is not
clearly available under all statutory schemes. 14  The Colorado
statute1 44  allows "any interested person" to petition the
Conservation Commission for a pooling order. 145 This can be
contrasted with the Texas statute as it existed at the time of Railroad
Commission v. Coleman. 146 That statute, as interpreted by the Texas
Supreme Court, provided that only owners who had drilled or
There has been a fairly substantial legislative response to the felt need for compulsive
process to deal with the situation where persons having minority interests in premises
overlying a producing formation refuse to unitize their premises with others despite
the public interest in maximum recovery of hydrocarbons. Statutes providing for
compulsory unitization under specified circumstances have been enacted in the states
of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming, and in the Canadian Provinces of
Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. In general, under these statutes a regulatory
agency is authorized to require unitization of a pool or some part thereof despite the
objection of minority interests therein if a proposed plan has been approved by a
requisite majority of the owners of interests in the premises to be unitized....
The Oklahoma and Arkansas statutes, along with a model statute proposed by
the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, have served as models for the several
compulsory unitization statutes enacted since the midpoint of this century. Thus the
Alaska and Nevada statutes are substantially identical with the Oklahoma statute, and
the other unitization statutes are based in large part upon the Oklahoma, Arkansas,
and model statutes.
H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL, & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS 794-95 (4th ed. 1979).
Provisions for compulsory pooling may be found in the following statutes: ALA. CODE S 9-17-13
(1980); ALASKA STAT. S 31.05.100(c) (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. S 27-505 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. S
53-115 (1971 & Supp. 1981); CAL. PuB. RES. CODE S 3608 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 34-60-
116 (1973 & Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 377.27 (West 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-706 (1978);
IDAHO CODE S 47-322 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96- '2, § 5436 (Smith-Hurd 1979); IND. CODE ANN.
§13-4-7-14 (Burns 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 84.8 (West 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 353,630 (1977);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:10 (West 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 319.13 (1981); Mtss. CODE
ANN. § 53-3-7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 259.110 (Vernon 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-202
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-909 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.060 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-
2-17 (1981); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0901 (McKinney 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-393
(1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, S 87.1 (West Supp. 1981);
OR. REV. STAT. § 520.220 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, 5 408 (Purdon 1964); S.D. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 45-9-31 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-202 (1980); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. 5 102.011-
.018 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-6() (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 78.52.240 (1962); W.
VA. CODE § 22-4A-7(b) (1981); Wyo. STAT, § 30-5-109 (1977).
142. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 38-08-08 (1980). Section 38-08-08 of the North Dakota Century
Code includes royalty owners among the parties who may pool their interests and provides that the
Industrial Commission may order pooling upon the application of "any interested person." Id.
143. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 905.2.
144. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116 (1973).
145. Id.
146. 460 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1970). The court quoted the Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act as
follows:
When two or more separately-owned tracts of land are embraced within a
common reservoir of oil or gas for which the Railroad Commission . . . has established
the size and shape of proration units, . . . and where there are separately-owned
interests in oil or gas embraced within an existing or proposed proration unit in the
common reservoir, and the owners have not agreed to pool their interests, and where
one or more of the owners have drilled or propose to drill a well on the proration unit
to the common reservoir, the Commission, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells,
or to protect correlative rights, or to prevent waste, shall, on the application to the
Commission of any such owner, establish a unit and pool all of the interests therein
within ... such proration unit, ...
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proposed to drill could invoke the Commission's power to pool.1 47
In its analysis the court compared the Texas statute with pooling
statutes from other states, which contained provisions like the
Colorado provision. 148 The Coleman court found the difference
between the phrase "any interested person" in the Colorado
statute and "any such owner" in the Texas provision to be
crucial.' 4 9  As practiced before the North Dakota Industrial
Commission, "any interested person" means any party with an
economic interest in the pool unit, including working interest
owners, royalty owners, and overriding royalty owners. 15 0
Courts have held that conservation statutes are a valid exercise
of the state's police power. 15 This position appears to be so settled
that the United States Supreme Court in the 1943 per curiam
opinion of Hunter Co. v. McHugh'5 2  dealt with the question
summarily. According to the Court, cases have held that "a state
has constitutional power to regulate production of oil and gas so as
to prevent waste and to secure equitable apportionment among
landholders of the migratory gas and oil underlying their land,
fairly distributing among them the costs of production and of the
apportionment.' ' 153 If an order under a conservation statute is
determined to be reasonable, it will likely be upheld by the
courts. 1
54
Railroad Comm'n v. Coleman, 460 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1970) (deletions made and emphasis in
original) (quoting TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c (Vernon 1968) (repealed 1977)).
Article 6008c has been repealed since the Coleman decision. The current Texas statute provides
that the owner of any interest in oil or gas in an existing or proposed proration unit, of any working
interest, or of an unleased tract other than a royalty owner may apply for the pooling of mineral
interests. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 102.012 (Vernon 1978).
147. 460 S.W.2d at 407.
148. Id. at 408.
149. Id. The Coleman court referred to an article by Professor Ernest E. Smith throughout its
opinion. Smith, The Texas Compulsory Pooling Act, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1965). In the article
Professor Smith discussed the persons who could apply for a pooling order under article 6008c, the
then new Texas statute. Id. at 1017-34. His comparative analysis of compulsory pooling statutes
placed North Dakota among the states with the most explicit statutes, which specifically include
royalty owners within the class of persons who may pool their interests into a unit. Id. at 1028-29.
150. Telephone interview with F. E. Wilborn, Deputy Chief Enforcement Officer, North
Dakota Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division (May 20, 1982).
151. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 77 (1911) (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900)) (the state, consistent with due process of law, may regulate oil
and gas production in a manner consistent with the rights of all who possess interests in a pool).
152. 320 U.S. 222 (1943).
153. Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222, 227 (1943) (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 77 (1911)) (upholding the power of the state to prevent owner from depleting
subterranean supply common to him and others by prohibiting pumping); Patterson v, Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376, 379 (1939) (when state commission makes its findings and order after
due hearing and evidence underlying its findings is not in the record, it must be assumed that the
findings are valid); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 76-77 (1937) (state may
constitutionally prorate production in order to prevent undue drainage from reserves or waste);
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 232-34 (1932) (right to take oil and
gas through wells on land is constitutionally subject to regulation by state so that the common supply
of gas and oil may not be unreasonably and wastefully depleted); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior
Court, 284 U.S. 8, 22 (1931) (statute regulating the exercise of correlative rights of surface owners
with respect to a common source of supply ofoil or gas is valid upon its face).
154. See Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 460 P.2d 415 (Okla. 1969). See also
NOTE
B. TREATMENT OF UNLEASED INTERESTS UNDER CONSERVATION
STATUTES
The question of what rights an unleased fractional mineral
interest owner is to be given under oil and gas conservation statutes
seems to fall within the legislatures' sound discretion. Under the
Oklahoma conservation statute, t 55 for example, the Corporation
Commission is authorized to fix the fractional mineral interest
owner's proportionate share of the unit drilling and operating
costs. 156 The Commission may order that fractional interest owners
elect either to pay their share of the unit drilling and operating costs
or to accept a fixed sum per acre as a bonus for a lease within a
specified period of time; if a timely election is not made, the
mineral owner is presumed to have elected to take the bonus for a
lease. 157
In Anderson v. Corporation Commission15 such an order was
challenged. 159 Anderson, the only owner not consenting to a plan of
development, wanted to "ride the well" and have his share of the
costs taken out of his share of any production. 160 The court rejected
this proposal and stressed the fact that the nonconsenting cotenant
had secured an interest in future production by virtue of a
compulsory pooling order. 16' The Anderson court held that the
subsequent Commission order setting the requirements for the
drilling of the well was a reasonable and necessary part of the
balancing of the rights of the mineral interest owners. 162 The court
also held that neither Anderson nor Ellison, the operator of the
well, had been subjected to a taking in any way. 163 The challenged
order gave Anderson the right to participate in production from a
well not located on his property.164 Ellison received the right to drill
the only well on the tract, which forced the parties to cooperate for
their mutual benefit and the protection of the public in general. 165
The California Supreme Court has held that a plan which does
not give an unleased owner the option to participate as a working
interest owner but does assure him at least a one-eighth royalty is
Youngblood v. Seewald, 299 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1961); Wood v. Citronelle Mobile Gathering
System, 279 Ala. 662, 189 So. 2d 346 (1966).
155. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, S 87.1 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1957).
159. Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699, 701 (Okla. 1957).
160. Id. at 702.
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not constitutionally defective. 166 The court found no showing that
the legislature's choice was arbitrary or unreasonable. 167 According
to the court, such a plan may not have been the best remedy
possible but it was a reasonable method to protect or provide a
substitute for the right to produce from one's own property. 6
The oil and gas conservation statutes of some states deal
expressly with unleased tracts. For example, an Oklahoma
statute 169 provides that owners of mineral rights within an unleased
tract are to be treated as lessees to the extent of seven-eighths of
their interest and lessors as to the remaining one-eighth interest. 7 0
New Mexico has a similar provision. 7 ' These statutes attempt to
put the unleased owner in a position similar to other mineral
owners. They assure that such an owner receives at least the
customary one-eighth royalty. The handling of the remaining
seven-eighths is still subject to the Corporation Commission's
power to order a timely election between participating as a working
interest owner through payment of well costs or selling his interest
for a bonus. This puts the unleased owner in a position identical to
a nonleasing fractional interest owner "pooled" with his leasing
cotenants under a Corporation Commission order. 1
72
The evenhanded treatment of undeveloped, unleased land
166. See Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal. 2d 315, -, 223 P.2d 465, 468 (1950). Hunter
sought to enjoin the enforcement of sections of the Public Resources Code which made drilling a well
in violation of its terms a nuisance. He based his attack on due process and equal protection grounds.
Id. at __ , 223 P.2d at 468.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 87.1 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
170. Section 87.1(3) of Oklahoma Statutes Annotated provides the following:
For the purpose of this section the owner or owners of oil and gas rights in and under
an unleased tract of land shall be regarded as a lessee to the extent of a seven-eighths
(7/8) interest in and to said rights and a lessor to the extent of the remaining one-eighth
(1/8) interest therein.
Id. § 87.1(3).
171. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-17(c) (1978). Section 70-2-17(c) of the New Mexico Statutes
Annotated provides the following:
If the interest of any owner or owners of any unleased mineral interest is pooled by
virtue of this act, seven-eighths of such interest shall be considered as a working
interest and one-eighth shall be considered a royalty interest, and he shall in all events
be paid one-eighth of all production from the unit and creditable to his interest.
Id. Other statutes with express provisions for unleased tracts include: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115 (A-
1)(e) (1971) (owner shall be regarded as the owner of a royalty interest to the extent of a one-eighth
interest in and to said unleased mineral interest); COLO. REv. STAT. § 34-60-116 7(c) (Supp. 1981)
(nonconsenting owner shall be deemed to have a landowner's royalty of 12-2 %); Ky. REV. STAT.
353.650 (1977) (the unleased mineral interest will be treated as a one-eighth royalty).
172. The current practice of the North Dakota Industrial Commission is to give a nonleasing
fractional interest owner a one-eighth royalty interest and a seven-eighths working interest. The
seven-eighths interest is subject to a statutory lien, N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (1980), but the risk
of a dry hole is borne by the operator. Telephone interview with F. E. Wilborn, Deputy Chief
Enforcement Officer, North Dakota Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division (May 20, 1982).
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pooled with producing land is illustrated by the Oklahoma case of
Barton v. Cleary Petroleum Corp. 173 In Barton, the unleased interest
owners contended that they were entitled to eight-eighths of the
production in proportion to their interest in the whole. 174 The
operator had drilled a gas well on a 640 acre spacing unit for a total
cost in excess of $200,000; total gross production before the well
was plugged and abandoned was $41,766.54.115 The Oklahoma
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendant,
holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a one-eighth pro rata share
of production from the date of the Commission's order, but to none
of the production prior to that order. 176 Because the developing
cotenant never recovered its cost of drilling and developing, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover a share greater than a working
interest owner. 1
77
The principle of law supported but not expressly applied in
Barton is that the right to share in production from a well located on
another's property is a creation of statute. 178 The Court of Appeals
of Louisiana expressed the following:
The creation of a drilling unit modifies the rule of
capture only to the extent that the Commissioner's
finding indicates unitization should reasonably insure
each tract will receive its just and equitable share of
reservoir content. Until such time as a unit is created, no
other tract is entitled to production from a well.
Unitization prevents the drilling of unnecessary wells to
capture the oil from the reservoir. 171
C. ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION AMONG POOLED INTERESTS
While an unleased mineral owner may choose to pay a portion
of operating costs, it should be remembered that he may elect to
accept a lease and relieve himself of any expenses of drilling and
production. 80 Under either arrangement there is a need to allocate
173. 566 P.2d 462 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
174. Barton v. Cleary Petroleum Corp., 566 P.2d 462, 463 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 463-64.
177. Id. at 464. Under § 38-08-08(2) of the North Dakota Century Code the drilling owner may
have a lien against the share of production accruing to the interest of an owner indebted to that
drilling owner for the costs of the spacing unit. He also has the right to market and sell the oil and gas
subject to the lien, applying the proceeds to the expenses secured by the lien. A working interest
owner would not receive any share of the production until his proportionate share of that production
were paid. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(2) (1980).
178. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Davis, 194 Okla. 84, __, 147 P.2d 135, 145 (1942) (rights
of nonleasing owners are creation of ordinance).
179. Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 897,'899 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
180. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 87.1 (West Supp. 1981-1982) (well spacing and
drilling units).
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production among the tracts combined to make the unit.'"' The
most straightforward way to allocate production is on the basis of
and in proportion to the acreage content of the drilling unit. 182 The
Mississippi Supreme Court approved this basis for allocation in
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Welborn. 183 The circuit court reversed
the order of the Oil and Gas Board when Welborn asserted that the
sands underlying his land were thicker and contained more
hydrocarbons, resulting in his being entitled to a greater share of
production.8 4 The court applied the state's conservation statute
85
which expressly provided that the allocation would be based on the
ratio of acres owned by the unleased mineral owner to the total
number of acres in the unit.
1 86
The North Dakota oil and gas conservation statute provides
that the allocation of production from a pooled tract is to be made
on a just and reasonable basis; however, the formula to be applied
is left to the Industrial Commission's discretion. 8 7 The statute
providing for allocation of production for a unitized field, however,
expressly provides that a separately owned tract's fair share be
measured as follows:
[The measure is] the value of each such tract for oil and
gas purposes and its contributing value to the unit in
relation to like values of other tracts in the unit, taking
into account acreage, the quantity of oil and gas
recoverable therefrom, location on structure, its probable
productivity of oil and gas in the absence of unit
operations, the burden of operation to which the tract will
or is likely to be subjected, or so many of said factors, or
such other pertinent engineering, geological, or operating
181. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 970. One commentary states the following:
One of the matters which frequently presents great difficulty in the negotiation of
[pooling and unitization] agreements is the allocation of unit production among the
premises included in the unit. There is, of course, no single method appropriate for all
situations . . . the methods specified by the statutes of the several states and by various
voluntary agreements vary substantially.
Id. (footnote omitted).
182. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 970.1. Among the other variables listed as helpful in
determining the allocation of production were (1) the drive mechanism available in the field; (2) well
productivity; (3) well density; (4) effect of prorationing; (5) acre feet of productive formation; (6) oil
initially in place beneath a tract; (7) extent and accuracy of information that has been obtained as a
result of exploratory operations; (8) the extent of penetration into the producing formation; and (9)
the current allowable formula. Id.
183. 216 Miss. 180, 62 So. 2d 211 (1953).
184. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Welborn, 216 Miss. 180, -, 62 So. 2d 211, 211
(1953).
185. Miss. CODE ANN. § 6132-22 (1948) (current version at Miss. CoDE ANN. S 53-3-7 (1972)).
186. 216 Miss. at__, 62 So. 2d at 212.
187. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-08-08(1) (1980).
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factors, as may be reasonably susceptible of deter-
mination. 88
Courts have recognized the difficulty of allocating production
in a perfect manner. 8 9 The complexity of the problem has led
legislatures to express the allocation standard broadly as in the
North Dakota pooling provision'9" or to use a litany of specific
factors to allocate production as in the North Dakota unitization
statute. 191 The Mississippi Supreme Court has said that no formula
could be devised which would secure for each landowner the exact
amount of oil and gas which underlies his land. 192 It went on to say
that "the surface acreage formula certainly is as fair and as
equitable as any formula devised by any other state. It has the
added merit of simplicity and certainty."
93
The type of technical data used in allocating production may
be of value to an unleased interest owner attempting to make an
informed election, but it is not likely to be available to him. 194 In
Home-Stake Royalty Corp. v. Corporation Commission'95 the request of
an owner who sought to have the operator support its application
for a pooling order with geological data was refused by the trial
court. 196 The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
refusal, reasoning that geologic studies of undeveloped areas are
proprietary information and that the owner of the information
should not be compelled to reveal it.' 97 The Home-Stake Royalty court
also held that the order equating the present value of a right to drill
with the price offered and accepted for leases on other parcels in the
tract was supported by substantial evidence. 
98
Another Oklahoma case approved this measure of royalty due
under a commission order. In Coogan v. Arkla Exploration Co. 199
unleased owners appealed from an order fixing cash bonuses at
thirty-five dollars an acre with a one-eighth royalty in lieu of
participating as a working interest.200 The Coogan court found that
the term of leases in the area was admissible to establish the
reasonable market value and that the trial court could reasonably
188. Id. S 38-08-09.4(2).
189. See Masonite Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 240 So. 2d 446, 450 (Miss. 1970).
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1)(1980).
191. Id. 5 38-08-09.4(2).
192. 240 So. 2d at 450.
193. Id. at 451.
194. Home-Stake Royalty Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 594 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Okla. 1979).
195. 594 P.2d 1207.
196. Id. at 1208.
197. Id. at 1210.
198. Id.
199. 589 P.2d 1061 (Okla. 1979).
200. Coogan v. Arkla Exploration Co., 589 P.2d 1061, 1061 (Okla. 1979).
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find that thirty-five dollars an acre, which was paid in sections
continuous with the pooled tract, was the market value even though
plaintiff provided evidence of a one hundred dollar an acre bonus
four to five miles from the tract.201
Oil and gas conservation statutes alter the common law rights
and status of mineral interest owners in significant ways. Under the
statutes a nonleasing owner may be made a party to development
without his consent. 202 A pooling order may dictate the terms under
which the mineral property will be developed.2 0 3 The most
generous of the plans will grant an unwilling owner the opportunity
to elect between a bonus or payment of a share of the unit
development costs in order to obtain a working interest share.
204
But, it would seem that such an option is not constitutionally
required. 20 5 Where an election option is granted, the mineral
interest owner has no right to see technical and geologic data
amassed during the exploratory phase of development.2 0 6 This is
protected as proprietary information. 20 7 So, in making his election,




Unleased mineral interest owners have many common law
remedies available to them, including contract, accounting, and
partition actions. Given the active nature of oil and gas
development, however, and the pervasive statutory and regulatory
control exercised by the states over this activity, fractional mineral
interest owners and natural resource developers are likely to rely on
the provisions of conservation statutes to settle disputes.
201. Id. at 1063.
202. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (1980).
203. Id.
204. Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699, 702 (Okla. 1958).
205. Hunter v.Justice's Court, 36 Cal. 2d 315, -, 223 P.2d 465, 468 (1950).
206. Home-Stake Royalty Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 594 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Okla. 1979).
207. Id.
208. The term doodlebuggers has been defined as follows:
[Doodlebuggers were] pseudo-scientific diviners and mystics - who materialized as if
by magic, promising new [wellsi. . . . Some professed supernatural gifts, others
claimed secret scientific knowledge, and all were prepared to lead promoters and
drillers to oil. A good many of them prospered, for a seer or diviner with a reputation
supplied the bemused wildcatter with faith, and wildcatters stubborn enough to drill
on locations ignored by others hit oil repeatedly during the early years in the
Southwest. Doodlebuggers, in fact - thanks to the laws of chance, the era's imperfect
understanding of underground structures, and the widespread presence of petroleum
in Texas and Oklahoma - discovered much more oil than geologists in the period of
feverish exploration after Spindletop.
TIME-LIFE BOOKS, INC., THE END AND THE MYTH 167 (1979).
NOTE 673
Under the conservation statutes in effect in a majority of
jurisdictions, an unleased owner will be given the option of paying
a portion of expenses, usually "up front," and assuring a working
interest share, or leasing his property under the terms of a pooling
order. Under this statutory plan a nonleasing mineral owner is
assured treatment equal to other royalty owners involved in the
pool, and those with the resources may assume the position that
would have been held by a lessee.
GENE 0. OLSON

